



JAN 30 2024

BOARD of CLALLAM COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

MINUTES for the week of January 22 – 26, 2024

WORK SESSION – 9 a.m.

The work session convened at 9 a.m., Monday, January 22, 2024. Present were Commissioners Ozias, Johnson and French, and Administrator Mielke.

Items of discussion per the agenda published January 18 were:

- Calendar/Correspondence
- Discuss and next steps on a Resolution establishing a Timber Revenue Advisory Committee
- Briefing and call for hearing to be held on Tuesday, February 13, 2024 regarding an Ordinance amending Clallam County Code Chapter 5.100 Consolidated Fee Schedule – Fairgrounds Division Services 215-A
- Review and approve of amended Parks Advisory Board Bylaws
- Resolution canceling uncollectible personal property taxes
- Discussion on 2023 refunds and 2024 refund levy
- Agreement with Recreation and Conservation Office for Local Parks Maintenance Grant
- Agreement with Public Utility District No. 1 of Clallam County to remove/replace a water main in conjunction with the Sekiu Sewer Project
- Notice to call for bids to be received no later than Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 10 a.m. regarding Carlsborg Repaving Project
- Resolution initiating a County Road Project designated as CRP C1261, Traffic Control Devices
- Briefing and notice to call for hearing to be held on Tuesday, February 13, 2024 at 10:30 a.m. regarding a proposed Ordinance titled Recreational Park Trailer Placement
- Code Enforcement Program update
- Discuss and next steps on Hearing Examiner request for proposal
- Legislative session update
- Resolution creating a Board of Commissioners Recompete Grant Department within the General Fund

Meeting concluded at 11:58 a.m. and continued to an executive session to be held at 1 p.m.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

The Board convened in open session at 1 p.m. to discuss potential/pending litigation. Present were Commissioners Ozias, French and Johnson, Chief Civil Prosecuting Attorney Boughton, Deputy Administrator/Risk Reyes, Administrator Mielke, Sheriff's Office King and Wenzl, and Chief Financial Officer Lane.

The Board of Commissioners will discuss with the Prosecuting Attorney's Office potential/pending litigation.

Per RCW 42.30.110(i), the Board may recess into executive session "to discuss with legal counsel representing the agency litigation . . . to which the agency, the governing body, or a member acting in an official capacity is, or is likely to become, a party, when public knowledge regarding the discussion is likely to result in an adverse legal or financial consequence to the agency."

ACTION TAKEN: CRJm to recess to executive session for 30 minutes, CMOs, mc

The Board recessed into executive session at 1:02 p.m.

The Board convened in open session at 1:31 p.m.

ACTION TAKEN: CRJm to recess to move the case to the Federal Court, CMOs, mc

Meeting concluded at 1:31 p.m.

REGULAR MEETING OF THE BOARD OF CLALLAM COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

Chair French called the meeting to order at 10 a.m., Tuesday, January 22, 2024. Also present were Commissioners Johnson and Ozias and Administrator Mielke.

REQUEST FOR MODIFICATIONS/APPROVAL OF AGENDA

ACTION TAKEN: CRJm to adopt the agenda as presented, CMOs, mc

PUBLIC COMMENT

- Ed Bowen, Clallam Bay, commented on Taxing Advisory Committee
- Ron Richards, Port Angeles, commented on short term rentals – affordable housing
- James Taylor, Port Angeles, commented on short term rentals – affordable housing

CONSENT AGENDA

1a Approval of vouchers for the week of January 15

1b Approval of minutes for the week of January 15

ACTION TAKEN: CRJm to adopt the consent agenda as modified, CMOs, mc

REPORTS AND PRESENTATIONS

- CMF recognized Layton Bud Lund for his service to Clallam County
 - Pam Rushton, Assessor's Office recognized Lund
- CRJ commented on Olympic Workforce Consortium Board, Healthy Youth Coalition
- CMO commented on Olympic Coast National Marine Sanctuary Meeting, North Olympic Development Council meeting, Department of Natural Resources
- CMF commented on Clallam Bay Fire District 5 meeting, Recompete, Clallam Bay Meeting January 26

CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS

2a Agreement with Jefferson County Public Health Department for Nurse-Family partnership

ACTION TAKEN: CRJm to approve, CMOs, mc

2b Agreement with Washington State Department of Military and U.S. Department of Homeland Security for Emergency Management Preparedness Grant

ACTION TAKEN: CRJm to approve, CMOs, mc

2c Agreement with First Step Family Support Center for Developmental Disability Funds/\$88,782

ACTION TAKEN: CRJm to approve, CMOs, mc

2d Agreement with Morningside for Developmental Disability Funds/\$38,175

ACTION TAKEN: CRJm to approve, CMOs, mc

2e Agreement with Pierce, Jones & Associates LLC Developmental Disability Funds/\$44,647

ACTION TAKEN: CRJm to approve, CMOs, mc

2f Agreement with Concerned Citizens Developmental Disability Funds/\$45,420

ACTION TAKEN: CRJm to approve, CMOs, mc

2g Agreement with Concerned Citizens Developmental Disability Funds/\$24,188

ACTION TAKEN: CRJm to approve, CMOs, mc

2h Agreement with Concerned Citizens Developmental Disability Funds/\$66,250

ACTION TAKEN: CRJm to approve, CMOs, mc

ADMINISTRATION

3a Purchase order for CrowdStrike and Falcon security monitoring and mitigating application suite

ACTION TAKEN: CRJm to issue notice, CMOs, mc

PUBLIC COMMENT




- John Joseph, commented on Jail issues for the public to speak with those in custody (see attached)
- Ron Richard, Port Angeles, commented on Department of Natural Resources, Climate Change
- Ed Telenick, Sequim, commented on Code Enforcement
- Kenneth Reandeau, Port Angeles, commented on Taxing Advisory Committee, Trust Lands Advisory Committee
- Ed Bowen, Clallam Bay, commented on Clallam Bay Fire District 5 Meeting, City of Port Angeles, taxing funds
- Karin Cummins, Sequim, commented on piping, landscape, Towne Road, Noise Ordinance
- Derrick Eberle, Sequim, commented on Towne Road
- Pepai Whipple, Sequim, commented on Towne Road
- Kathleen Keen, Sequim, commented on Clallam County voter research project
- Deidre Unknow last name, Port Angeles, commented on Towne Road
- Blackman, Sequim, showed a sign
- Jeff Tozzer, Sequim, commented on Towne Road
- Virginia Shogren, Sequim, commented on piping project
- Rob White, Sequim, commented on Clallam County Conservation District, piping project
- Denise Lapio, Sequim, commented on Bills

Meeting concluded at 11:20 a.m. and continued to 9 a.m., Monday, January 29, 2024.

The Board of Commissioners attended WSAC Virtual Update, Williams Shore Memorial Pools District Meeting, Coffee with Colleen, and WSAC Legislative Update during the week of January 22.

PASSED AND ADOPTED this 30th day of January 2024.

ATTEST: 
Loni Gores, MMC, Clerk of the Board

 BOARD OF CLALLAM COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

Mike French, Chair

Randy Johnson

Mark Ozias

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS:

ATM Administrator Todd Mielke
CMO Commissioner Mark Ozias
CRJ Commissioner Randy Johnson
CMF Commissioner Mike French

m moved
mc motion carried
s seconded

John Joseph RN. ARNP, MSN`
3265 Obrien Rd. Port Angeles, WA. 98362
Phone: 360-460-6707

John Joseph
Public comment
1/23/24

January 14, 2024

To: County Commissioners of Clallam County, WA.

Re: Inmate Contact while in Clallam County Jail.

Around Thanksgiving time my son Jonathan was arrested for unlawful trespass. He was released from jail the day before Thanksgiving. He missed his first court date and then was re-arrested for trespass again and the warrant for the first no show to court. I don't know all the particulars but was told there are assault charges with the second arrest.

Jonathan is a client at Peninsula Behavior Health. A full Forensic Psychological evaluation was done on July 4, 2023. He is diagnosed with :

Schizophrenia, Bipolar, Depression,

Anti-Social personality and he fits into an Autism Spectrum,

He is in the low spectrum of intelligence in many areas,

Addiction to alcohol and drugs.

He was born an addict; his biological mother was an addict and did not quit drugs when she was pregnant with Jonathan or his sister. My Wife and I adopted Jonathan at 6 years old. Jonathan is now 25.

Our Story is not unlike many other parents and grandparents today raising grandchildren and great grandchildren.

I have been working with Tamara Vanove Family Therapeutic Court Coordinator for the Superior Court of Clallam County, to see if we can get a competency evaluation on Jonathan. He has agreed to an evaluation.

Why am I before you? I have not been able to speak to my son since he has been in jail. He called and it was a collect call from an area code outside of Washington.

I went to the jail to try and speak to my son. Each of the 5 different times I made the trip to the jail, I talked to a different jailer and most of them were not helpful. All they would tell me was go on line and sign up. I asked for help and was told to go to the Library. I was told I could write a letter and mail it to my grandson but I am NOT ALLOWED to ask a jailer to give him a note.

The agency that handles the inmate calls are long distance and all calls are collect from anywhere in the states.

There are fee stations in the hall of the jail entrance that I can use. I signed into one of the hall stations. I had to wait 48 hours to see if I am worthy of speaking to my son. I was told I could use the hall computers for visiting. On the third trip to the jail, I was told the hall stations were for SATURDAY VISITS. I went back to the jail on Saturday and was told I could not have a visit that I had to make an appointment.

My son has been in Jail from the end of December to present, and I still have not been allowed to contact my disabled son.

This could all have been averted with a clear large print handout explaining the process of visiting inmates. A local person or phone number of someone we can understand to help us through the How, When and Where to contact family who may be in jail.

I believe the Americans with Disability Act is not being met for either the incarcerated or the families of handicap inmates in Clallam County Jail.

Respectfully:

John Joseph RN, ARNP, MSN

INMATE VISITING

WEB ADDRESS: VISITEL.US

PHONE #: 1.800.583.9683

John Joseph
Public Comment
1/23/24

CREATING NEW ACCOUNT:

1. SELECT "CREATE A NEW ACCOUNT NOW" OR SIGN-IN WITH USERNAME AND PASSWORD

The screenshot shows the VisiTel website interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with links: Home, Make Payment, Visitation, E-mail, Rates, and Help. To the right of the navigation bar, there is a language selection dropdown menu labeled "Para Español: Select Language" and a "Login | New Account" link. Below the navigation bar, there is a large image of a family (a man, a woman, and a young girl) smiling. To the right of the image, there is a login form with the following fields: "User Name / Email:" and "Password:". Below these fields is a "Submit" button. Above the "Submit" button, there is a red error message that reads "Invalid account information". Below the "Submit" button, there are links for "Lost Password?" and "New Account". Below the login form, there is a "Welcome!" section with the text: "Welcome to the VisiTel Customer Portal. With a VisiTel account, you can schedule Video Visitation calls from your home or at the Detention Center. Once registered you can:" followed by a list of features: "Schedule and place Video Visitation calls", "Manage your account online", "Make payments online", and "Create a new account now". At the bottom of the page, there is a footer with the text "VisiTel Copyright © 2015".

VisiTel

Para Español: Select Language

Login | New Account

Home Make Payment Visitation E-mail Rates Help

Invalid account information

User Name / Email:

Password:

Submit

Lost Password? New Account

Welcome!

Welcome to the VisiTel Customer Portal.

With a VisiTel account, you can schedule Video Visitation calls from your home or at the Detention Center.

Once registered you can:

- Schedule and place Video Visitation calls
- Manage your account online
- Make payments online
- Create a new account now

Home | Help

VisiTel Copyright © 2015

2. **FILL OUT REQUIRED BOXES AND REVIEW THE TERMS LISTED BELOW THE FIELDS**

New Account

* Instructions: Complete the form below and agree to the terms below. Please use a correct email address and phone number.

If you already have a user account please login [here](#)

Login Information

* E-mail

* Password

* Re-Type Password

Account Information

* Correctional Facility

* Area Code * Phone Number -

* First Name

* Last Name

* Date of Birth

* Address

Address 2

* City

* State

* Zip Code

☐ * I agree to the terms below

VisiTel

Para Español:

 Select Language | ▼

6/28/2023 9:00:15 AM

[My Account](#) | [Log Off](#) | [Help](#)

[Home](#) | [Make Payment](#) | [Visitation](#) | [E-mail](#) | [Rates](#) | [Help](#)

New Account Complete

Your account has been created. Please click the continue button.

[Home](#) | [Help](#)

VisiTel Copyright © 2015

3. REVIEW EACH TAB FOR INSTRUCTIONS

Home Policies My Schedules Request Access Schedule Visit

Visitation Approval Status

Inmate	Outmate	At Home
No records to display.		

Page size: 25 of 25 0 items in 1 pages

Remote Video Visitation Guide

What is video visitation? Video Visitation allows you to video conference with a friend or family member in jail from your computer or mobile device.

To start:

1. Click on the Request Access above. Once approved by the jail, you will receive an email confirmation.
2. Click on Schedule Visit to schedule a video conference with the inmate.
3. Make sure you purchase minutes on your account.
4. At the time of your visitation, log online and start the video conference.

What are the policies regarding video visitation?

Please see the policies menu above. All visits are monitored and recording. Please follow the policies guide for your facility. Breaking the policies can result in having the visitation privilege revoked.

How much does it cost?

Please see the rates from the menu above. Please make payment prior to your Video Visitation. Minutes are deducted from your account as they are used. You may use your minutes for multiple visits. Minutes are not refundable.

How do I join a video visitation?

Once your video visitation has been approved by the Detention Center. Click on "Start Visitation" under My Approval Status from above. If you do not see the button, your approval has not been processed.

How long does it take to get approved for visits?

The Correctional Facility approves all visitations for on-site and remote visits. If you have not been approved within 24 hours please contact the Correctional Facility.

Supported Devices

4. SELECT "REQUEST ACCESS"

Home Policies My Schedules Request Access Schedule Visit

Step 1 of 6 - Select Inmate

Inmate Search

* Facility: Clallam County WA

* Last Name: Search

<< Previous Next >> Cancel

Home | Help

VisiTel Copyright © 2015

- SELECT "CLALLAM COUNTY WA" AS THE FACILITY
- ENTER LAST NAME OF INMATE AND PRESS THE "SEARCH" BUTTON
- READ THE VISITATION POLICY AND "AGREE" TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS

Step 2 of 6 - Visitation Policy

Inmate Visitation Policy

- Only visitors listed on the inmate's pre-approved list will be allowed to visit. Inmates must make prior application for each visitor, providing the prospective visitor's full name and date of birth.
- After the inmate establishes his or her approved visitor's list, changes (dropping and adding new visitors) can be made on the 1st and 3rd Monday of the month.
- Inmates sentenced to ten (10) days or less are not allowed visitors.
- Visitors are allowed to be on one (1) inmate's visiting list only.
- Visitors must be eighteen (18) years or older and provide current valid governmental photo identification to enter OR...
Visitors under eighteen (18) years of age must provide birth certificates or proof of age and must be accompanied by a parent or legal guardian who is on the inmate's pre-approved list.
- Legal guardians and emancipated juveniles must present papers signed by a judge showing guardianship or emancipation at the time of admittance.
- Visitors will not be admitted in the final fifteen (15) minutes of the visiting period.
- Visitors and their property are subject to search prior to entry.
- Visitors under the influence of intoxicants will be denied entry.
- Visitors are not allowed to bring any property to visiting except proper identification.
- Lockers are provided in the Jail Lobby for your convenience. It takes a quarter to use the property locker but the locker returns the quarter to the user when the user finishes using the locker.

You must agree to the Visitation Policy ☒ agree to the terms and conditions above

5. FOLLOW INSTRUCTION TO UPLOAD PHOTO OF YOURSELF

Step 3 of 6 - Take photo of your self

Photo of you required. *** Make sure the image is CLEAR, or your visit will get declined

INSTRUCTIONS:

- On the Flash Popup box, select your webcam and "click close".
- Click Allow
- Center your face on the "Live Webcam" image
- Click "Take Photo"
- Click "Save Photo"
- When done, click on Next >>

File Upload

No file selected.

6. FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS TO UPLOAD COPY OF DRIVERS LICENSE

Step 4 of 6 - Take photo of your ID

Government issued id with Photo Required *** Make sure the image is CLEAR and READABLE, or your visit will get declined

INSTRUCTIONS:

- On the Flash Popup box, select your webcam and "click close"
- Click Allow
- Center your ID in front of the camera
- Click "Take Photo"
- Click "Save Photo"
- When done, click on Next >>



File Upload

Browse... No file selected.

7. VERIFY INFORMATION AND PRESS NEXT IF CORRECT

Home

Policies

My Schedules

Request Access

Schedule Visit

Step 5 of 6 - Confirm

Visitation Request Confirm

Please confirm your approval request. Click on the Next Button to request an approval from the detention facility.

RequestId: 28535

Type: VideoVisitation

Requestor: [REDACTED]

Inmate: [REDACTED]

Status: PendingUserCompletion

<< Previous

Next >>

Cancel

8. YOU WILL RECEIVE AN EMAIL STATING YOUR REQUEST IS "PENDING APPROVAL"

Visitation Approval Request - PendingApproval

support@visitel.us
To: You
Wed 6/28/2023 10:11 AM

VisiTel Visitation Approval Request - PendingApproval

Your visitation approval request has been updated. Status has been changed.

Visitation Approval Request
RequestId Id: 28535
Name: [REDACTED]
Facility: Clallam County WA - S002019058
Inmate: [REDACTED]
Request Date: 6/28/2023 9:11:46 AM
At Home Approval:
At Facility Approval:
Reason:

To start your remote visitation [CLICK HERE](#)

secure.visitel.us | support@visitel.us

****PLEASE ALLOW FOR UP TO 24 HOURS FOR REQUEST TO BE REVIEWED****

9. ONCE REQUEST HAS BEEN REVIEWED, YOU WILL RECEIVE A FOLLOW UP EMAIL

support@visitel.us
To: You
Wed 6/28/2023 10:17 AM

VisiTel Visitation Approval Request - Processed

Your visitation approval request has been updated. Status has been changed.

Visitation Approval Request
RequestId Id: 28535
Name: [REDACTED]
Facility: Clallam County WA - S002019058
Inmate: [REDACTED]
Request Date: 6/28/2023 9:17:36 AM
At Home Approval: True
At Facility Approval: True
Reason:

To start your remote visitation [CLICK HERE](#)

secure.visitel.us | support@visitel.us

10. SIGN INTO VISITEL.US AND SELECT "MAKE PAYMENT"

VisiTel

Para Español
Select Language ▼

6/28/2023 9:20:18 AM
brendan.27@live.com | My Account | Log Off | Help

Home Make Payment Visitation E-mail Rates Help

Step 1 of 3 - Enter Billing Information

Facility

- FILL OUT FORM AND MAKE PAYMENT FOR VISITATION AND/OR EMAILS

11. TO SCHEDULE VISIT, SELECT VISITATION AND THEN "SCHEDULE VISIT"

Home Make Payment Visitation E-mail Rates Help

Home Policies My Schedules Request Access Schedule Visit

Step 1 of 6 - Select Inmate

If you do not see the inmate's name below, please click on the "Request Access" tab above.

Inmates on My Account

	InmateId	Name	Facility	Video Visit at Facility Approval	Video Visit at Home Approval	Email Approval
	92807	[REDACTED]	Clallam County WA			

Page size: 25 1 items in 1 pages

- SELECT PERSON TO VISIT

12. AGREE TO POLICY

Step 2 of 6 - Visitation Policy

Inmate Visitation Policy

- Only visitors listed on the inmate's pre-approved list will be allowed to visit. Inmates must make prior application for each visitor, providing the prospective visitor's full name and date of birth.
- After the inmate establishes his or her approved visitor's list, changes (dropping and adding new visitors) can be made on the 1st and 3rd Monday of the month.
- Inmate's sentenced to ten (10) days or less are not allowed visitors.
- Visitors are allowed to be on one (1) inmate's visiting list only.
- Visitors must be eighteen (18) years or older and provide current valid governmental photo identification to enter OR...
• Visitors under eighteen (18) years of age must provide birth certificates or proof of age and must be accompanied by a parent or legal guardian who is on the inmate's pre-approved list.
- Legal guardians and emancipated juveniles must present papers signed by a judge showing guardianship or emancipation at the time of admittance.
- Visitors will not be admitted in the final fifteen (15) minutes of the visiting period.
- Visitors and their property are subject to search prior to entry.
- Visitors under the influence of intoxicants will be denied entry.
- Visitors are not allowed to bring any property to visiting except proper identification.
- Lockers are provided in the jail lobby for your convenience. It takes a quarter to use the property locker but the locker returns the quarter to the user when the user finishes using the locker.

I agree to the terms and conditions above

<< Previous Next >> Cancel

13. SELECT "AT HOME" OR "ON SITE" VISIT OPTIONS

Step 3 of 6 - On-site or at home

* Is this visit for an On-site or Internet Visit? ☒ At home internet visit ☐ On-site at the Facility

<< Previous

Next >>

Cancel

- PLEASE NOTE THAT "AT HOME" VISITS WILL BE CHARGED TO YOUR VISITEL ACCOUNT
- "ON SITE" VISITS ARE FREE BUT NEED TO BE MADE 24 HRS IN ADVANCE
 - o "ON SITE" AND "AT HOME" VISITATION HOURS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

Onsite Visitation Schedule - Clallam County Jail

First Letter of Last Name	Day(s)	Time(s)
A to K	Saturday	8 am to 11 am and 1 pm to 3 pm
L to Z	Sunday	8 am to 11 am and 1 pm to 3 pm

Remote Visitation Schedule - Clallam County Jail

First Letter of Last Name	Day(s)	Time(s)
All Inmates	Monday to Friday	10 am to 1 pm
All Inmates	Saturday to Sunday	4 pm to 10 pm

14. SELECT VISIT DATE AND TIME

[Home](#) [Policies](#) [My Schedules](#) [Request Access](#) [Schedule Visit](#)

Step 4 of 8 - Select Date and Time

Visitation Id:

706254

Requestor:

Balance:

0 minutes

* Inmate:

* Is this visit for an On-site or Internet Visit?

onsite

* Facility Date:

07/02/2023

* Facility Time:

08:00:00 AM - 08:30:00 AM

Status:

PendingUserCompletion

<< Previous

Next >>

Cancel

15. CONFIRM INFORMATION IS CORRECT

Step 5 of 8 - Confirm

Visitation Request Confirm

Please confirm your visitation schedule. Click on the Next Button to request an approval from the detention facility.

Visitation Id:

706254

Requestor:

Balance:

0 minutes

* Inmate:

* Is this visit for an On-site or Internet Visit?

onsite

* Facility Date:

07/02/2023

* Facility Time:

08:00:00 AM - 08:30:00 AM

Status:

PendingUserCompletion

<< Previous

Next >>

Cancel

16. SELECT "MY SCHEDULE" FOR VISITATION SCHEDULE AND TO LOG IN FOR AT HOME VISIT

Home | Make Payment | Visitation | **E-mail** | Rates | Help

Home | Policies | **My Schedules** | Request Access | Schedule Visit

Refreshing in 54seconds [refresh now](#)

ID	Inmate	Date Scheduled	Duration	Status	Type	
706254	[REDACTED]	7/2/2023 9:00:00 AM	00:30:00	Approved	On site at the Detention Center	Cancel
706255	[REDACTED]	6/30/2023 1:00:00 PM	00:30:00	Approved	Internet Visit	Cancel

Page size: 5 | 2 items in 1 pages

Home | Help
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- PLEASE CHECK YOUR EMAIL AS WELL FOR CONFIRMATION

Public comment
JEFF TOZZER
V23/24

Jeff Tozzer, Jamestown Road, Sequim

Constituents have ongoing concerns regarding the transparency and accountability of their commissioners. These concerns stem from a series of events that have recently been discovered.

When the Jamestown Tribe breached the old river dike ahead of schedule, it resulted in the unplanned and avoidable closure of Towne Road. There was no public announcement explaining the cause -- instead, Commissioner Mark Ozias agreed to manipulate the language of a resolution that absolved his campaign's top donor of any blame. The true cause of the road's closure was concealed from the public.

Less than a year ago Commissioner Ozias halted the completion of Towne Road and told the public that "hundreds of signatures" from "several petitions" had been received calling for the road's closure. In truth, it was only 98 signatures from two petitions. Commissioner Ozias misinformed the public and withheld that 140 signatures *supporting* the road's opening had been received.

Commissioner Ozias stood before his community during an informational meeting last September and presented three options that would open Towne Road, but he had already privately promised a fourth option to a landowner that would install tax-funded, automatic, electric gates and close the road to the public. This was also the option favored by his campaign's top donor. The commissioner withheld that insurance rates would spike in Dungeness if the road were to remain closed and that first responders had warned the commissioners of the detrimental effects to public safety. This informational meeting was seemingly a show because the constituents had already been left out of the process.

What's on the horizon? The Dungeness River Off Channel Reservoir. This massive infrastructure project makes the Towne Road Levee Setback Project seem small in comparison, but it has all the same hallmarks: it is a multi-agency effort, decades in the making, with tens of millions in grant funding, and it must strike a balance between recreation and public safety. The county will once again be collaborating with Ozias' top donor, the Tribe, and it is all happening in Commissioner Ozias' district.

Will we, the residents, have a seat at the table after seeing how we were shut out of the Towne Road project? What information has already been withheld from the public? What backroom deals have already been made? What promises have been made to friends, neighbors, and campaign donors?

I'll close with a quote that Commissioner Ozias gave when plans for Sequim's MAT clinic were first unveiled and he had the monumental task of reassuring a divided community. He said:

"Many have expressed belief that this work has taken place in private, without informing the public. One core belief I have as an elected official is that local government only works when citizens participate. It troubles me greatly to think that so many feel they have been left out of the process."

Commissioner Ozias, does it still trouble you greatly when your constituents feel they have been left out of the process?

Public Comment – Clallam County Board of Commissioners, January 23, 2024

Public Comment
Virginia Shogren
1/23/24

Virginia Shogren, 961 W. Oak Court, Sequim WA.

Last week, I notified this Board of serious issues with piping projects in the Sequim and Agnew regions. The vast majority of the projects have been overseen and managed by the Conservation District.

I have asked for the County's piping permits for the reported 66 miles of piping laid thus far.

I also alerted Public Works to a current piping project on Barr Road reportedly under investigation by the State for lack of engineering.

I was told that this County has issued NO permits for any of the piping work done to date on these projects.

And I've received no response to multiple emails sent to the County Right of Way agent raising concerns with the current piping project on Barr Road.

The apparent lack of oversight by the County for these extensive piping projects raises many questions, and could pose a liability concern for the County.

I highly recommend a county-wide piping moratorium to allow for an investigation into the County's apparent lack of oversight and potential level of culpability for the extensive damage being caused by these projects.

Switching to another topic. Members of this Board sit on the Clallam county Canvassing Board. You have received extensive oral and written public comment over the past 18 months documenting the potential problems with using programmable electronics to conduct signature verification and vote tabulation for Clallam County elections.

Today, I am submitting to the Clerk a copy of the Declaration of Terpsehore P. Maras which was provided to the Canvassing Board for its public meetings dated August 3, 2022 and November 27, 2023.

The Maras Declaration was filed in the federal court case of *Feehan v. Wisconsin Elections Commission*, Case No. 2:20-cv-01771.

In her capacity as a former contractor for intelligence agencies tasked with election operations, Ms. Maras describes in her declaration the methods used to manipulate election outcomes both domestically and overseas.

Members of this Board are on actual notice that our federal intelligence community engages in election operations both domestically and overseas that rely, in significant part, on trap door access to the software used in voting systems.


Clallam County should have no involvement with this activity. I highly recommend that this Board take immediate action to secure Clallam County elections.

Declaration of Terpsehore P Maras

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C Section 1746, I, Terpsehore P Maras, make the following declaration.

1. I am over the age of 21 years and I am under no legal disability, which would prevent me from giving this declaration.
2. I have been a private contractor with experience gathering and analyzing foreign intelligence and acted as a LOCALIZER during the deployment of projects and operations both OCONUS and CONUS. I am a trained Cryptolinguist, hold a completed degree in Molecular and Cellular Physiology and have FORMAL training in other sciences such as Computational Linguistics, Game Theory, Algorithmic Aspects of Machine Learning, Predictive Analytics among others.
3. I have operational experience in sources and methods of implementing operations during elections both CONUS and OCONUS
4. I am an amateur network tracer and cryptographer and have over two decades of mathematical modeling and pattern analysis.
5. In my position from 1999-2014 I was responsible for delegating implementation via other contractors sub-contracting with US or 9 EYES agencies identifying connectivity, networking and subcontractors that would manage the micro operations.
6. My information is my personal knowledge and ability to detect relationships between the companies and validate that with the cryptographic knowledge I know and attest to as well as evidence of these relationships.
7. In addition, I am WELL versed due to my assignments during my time as a private contractor of how elections OCONUS (for countries I have had an assignment at) and CONUS (well versed in HAVA ACT) and more.
8. On or about October 2017 I had reached out to the US Senate Majority Leader with an affidavit claiming that our elections in 2017 may be null and void due to lack of EAC certifications. In fact Sen. Wyden sent a letter to Jack Cobb on 31 OCT 2017 advising discreetly pointing out the importance of being CERTIFIED EAC had issued a certificate to

Pro V & V and that expired on Feb 24, 2017. No other certification has been located.



9. Section 231(b) of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 (42 U.S.C. §15371(b)) requires that the EAC provide for the accreditation and revocation of accreditation of independent, non-federal laboratories qualified to test voting systems to Federal standards. Generally, the EAC considers for accreditation those laboratories evaluated and recommended by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) pursuant to HAVA Section 231(b)(1). However, consistent with HAVA Section 231(b)(2)(B), the Commission may also vote to accredit laboratories outside of those recommended by NIST upon publication of an explanation of the reason for any such accreditation.

United States Department of Commerce
National Institute of Standards and Technology



Certificate of Accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025:2017

NVLAP LAB CODE: 200978-0

Pro V&V
Huntsville, AL

*is accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program for specific services,
listed on the Scope of Accreditation, for:*

Voting System Testing

*This laboratory is accredited in accordance with the recognized International Standard ISO/IEC 17025:2017.
This accreditation demonstrates technical competence for a defined scope and the operation of a laboratory quality
management system (refer to joint ISO-ILAC-IAF Communiqué dated January 2009).*

2020-03-26 through 2021-03-31
Effective Dates



[Signature]
For the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program

10.

11. VSTL's are VERY important because equipment vulnerabilities allow for deployment of algorithms and scripts to intercept, alter and adjust voting tallies.
12. There are only TWO accredited VSTLs (VOTING SYSTEM TEST LABORATORIES). In order to meet its statutory requirements under HAVA §15371(b), the EAC has developed the EAC's Voting System Test Laboratory Accreditation Program. The procedural requirements of the program are established in the proposed information collection, the EAC Voting System Test Laboratory Accreditation Program Manual. Although participation in the program is voluntary, adherence to the program's procedural requirements is mandatory for participants. The procedural requirements of this Manual will supersede any prior laboratory accreditation requirements issued by the EAC. This manual shall be read in conjunction with the EAC's Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual (OMB 3265-0019).



MICHIGAN

<i>State Participation:</i>	Requires Testing by an Independent Testing Authority. MI requires that voting systems are certified by an independent testing authority accredited by NASED and the board of state canvassers.
<i>Applicable Statute(s):</i>	"An electronic voting system shall not be used in an election unless it is approved by the board of state canvassers ... and unless it meets 1 of the following conditions: (a) Is certified by an independent testing authority accredited by the national association of state election directors and by the board of state canvassers. (b) In the absence of an accredited independent testing authority, is certified by the manufacturer of the voting system as meeting or exceeding the performance and test standards referenced in subdivision (a) in a manner prescribed by the board of state canvassers." <u>MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 168.795a</u> (2009).
<i>Applicable Regulation(s):</i>	MI does not have a regulation regarding the federal certification process.
<i>State Certification Process:</i>	The Secretary of State accepts requests from persons/corporations wishing to have their voting system examined. The requestor must pay the Secretary of State an application fee of \$1,500.00, file a report listing all of the states in which the voting system has been approved and any reports that these states have made regarding the performance of the voting system. The Board of State Canvassers conducts a field test involving Michigan electors and election officials in simulated election day conditions. The Board of State Canvassers shall approve the voting system if it meets all of the state requirements. <u>MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN § 168.795a</u> (2009).
<i>Fielded Voting Systems:</i>	<i>[After the EAC completes and issues the 2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey, information about fielded voting systems will be added to this document. In the meantime, readers may find information on the voting systems at the following website (if available)].</i> http://www.michigan.gov/sos/0,1607,7-127-1633_8716_45458---,00.html



WISCONSIN

<i>State Participation:</i>	Requires Testing by a Federally Accredited Laboratory. WI requires that its voting systems receive approval from an independent testing authority accredited by NASED verifying that the voting systems meet all of the recommended FEC standards.
<i>Applicable Statute(s):</i>	"No ballot, voting device, automatic tabulating equipment or relating equipment and materials to be used in an electronic voting system may be utilized in this state unless it is approved by the board [of election commissioners]." <u>WIS. STAT. ANN. § 5.91</u> (West 2009).
<i>Applicable Regulation(s):</i>	"An application for approval of an electronic voting system shall be accompanied by all of the following ... [r]eports from an independent testing authority accredited by the national association of state election directors (NASED) demonstrating that the voting system conforms to all the standards recommended by the federal elections commission." <u>WIS. ADMIN. CODE GAB § 7.01</u> (2009).
<i>State Certification Process:</i>	The Board of Election Commissioners accepts applications for the approval of electronic voting systems. Once the application is completed, the vendor must set up the voting system for three mock elections using: (1) offices, (2) referenda questions and (3) candidates. A panel of local election officials can assist the Board in the review of the voting system. The Board conducts the test using a mock election for the partisan primary, general election, and nonpartisan election. The Board may also require that the voting system be used in an actual election as a condition of the approval. <u>WIS. ADMIN. CODE GAB §§ 7.01, 7.02</u> (2009).
<i>Fielded Voting Systems:</i>	<i>[After the EAC completes and issues the 2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey, information about fielded voting systems will be added to this document. In the meantime, readers may find information on the voting systems at the following website (if available)].</i> http://elections.state.wi.us/section.asp?linkid=643&locid=47



State Participation: **Requires Federal Certification.** GA requires that its voting systems are tested to EAC standards by EAC accredited labs and certified by the EAC.

Applicable Statute(s): "Any person or organization owning, manufacturing, or selling, or being interested in the manufacture or sale of, any voting machine may request the Secretary of State to examine the machine. Any ten or more electors of this state may, at any time, request the Secretary of State to reexamine any voting machine previously examined and approved by him or her. Before any such examination or reexamination, the person, persons, or organization requesting such examination or reexamination shall pay to the Secretary of State the reasonable expenses of such examination; provided, however, that in the case of a request by ten or more electors the examination fee shall be \$ 250.00. The Secretary of State may, at any time, in his or her discretion, reexamine any voting machine." GA CODE ANN. § 21-2-324 (2008).

Applicable Regulation(s): "Prior to submitting a voting system for certification by the State of Georgia, the proposed voting system's hardware, firmware, and software must have been issued Qualification Certificates from the EAC. These EAC Qualification Certificates must indicate that the proposed voting system has successfully completed the EAC Qualification testing administered by EAC approved ITAs. If for any reason, this level of testing is not available, the Qualification tests shall be conducted by an agency designated by the Secretary of State. In either event, the Qualification tests shall comply with the specifications of the *Voting Systems Standards* published by the EAC." GA. COMP. R. & RES. 590-8-1-.01 (2009).

State Certification Process: After the voting system has passed EAC Qualification testing, the vendor of the voting system submits a letter to the Office of the Secretary of State requesting certification for the voting system along with a technical data package to the certification agent. An evaluation proposal is created by the certification agent after a preliminary view of the Technical Data Package and sent to the vendor. Any additional EAC ITA testing identified in the evaluation proposal is arranged by the vendor and the certification agent will perform all other tests identified in the evaluation proposal. The certification agent submits a report of their findings to the Secretary of State. Based on these findings the Secretary of State will make a final determination on whether to certify the voting system. GA. COMP. R. & RES. 590-8-1-.01 (2009).

Fielded Voting Systems: [After the EAC completes and issues the 2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey, information about fielded voting systems will be added to this document. In the meantime, readers may find information on the voting systems at the following website (if available)].
<http://www.sos.georgia.gov/Elections/>



PENNSYLVANIA

<i>State Participation:</i>	Requires Testing by a Federally Accredited Laboratory. PA requires that its voting systems are approved by a federally recognized independent testing laboratory as meeting federal voting system standards.
<i>Applicable Statute(s):</i>	“Any person or corporation owning, manufacturing or selling, or being interested in the manufacture or sale of, any electronic voting system, may request the Secretary of the Commonwealth to examine such system if the voting system has been examined and approved by a federally recognized independent testing authority and if it meets any voting system performance and test standards established by the Federal Government.” <u>25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. Code § 3031.5</u> (West 2008).
<i>Applicable Regulation(s):</i>	PA does not have a regulation regarding the federal certification process.
<i>State Certification Process:</i>	The Secretary of State examines voting systems, upon request, once the voting systems have received approval by a federally recognized independent testing authority. The person(s) requesting the examination of the voting system are responsible for the cost of the examination. After the examination, the Secretary of State issues a report stating whether or not the voting systems are safe and compliant with state and federal requirements. If the voting systems are deemed safe and compliant by the Secretary of State then the systems may be adopted and approved for use in elections by each county through a majority vote of its qualified electors. <u>25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. Code §§ 3031.5, 3031.2</u> (West 2008).
<i>Fielded Voting Systems:</i>	<i>[After the EAC completes and issues the 2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey, information about fielded voting systems will be added to this document. In the meantime, readers may find information on the voting systems at the following website (if available)].</i> <u>http://www.votespa.com/HowtoVote/tabid/74/language/en-US/Default.aspx</u>



ARIZONA

<i>State Participation:</i>	Requires Testing by a Federally Accredited Laboratory. AZ requires that its voting systems are HAVA compliant and approved by a laboratory that is accredited pursuant to HAVA.
<i>Applicable Statute(s):</i>	"On completion of acquisition of machines or devices that comply with HAVA, machines or devices used at any election for federal, state or county offices may only be certified for use in this state and may only be used in this state if they comply with HAVA and if those machines or devices have been tested and approved by a laboratory that is accredited pursuant to HAVA." <u>ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-442(B)</u> (2008).
<i>Applicable Regulation(s):</i>	AZ does not have a regulation regarding the federal certification process.
<i>State Certification Process:</i>	The Secretary of State appoints a committee of three people that test different voting systems. This committee is required to submit their recommendations to the Secretary of State who then makes the final decision on which voting system(s) to adopt. <u>ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-442(A) and (C)</u> (2008).
<i>Fielded Voting Systems:</i>	<i>[After the EAC completes and issues the 2008 Election Administration and Voting Survey, information about fielded voting systems will be added to this document. In the meantime, readers may find information on the voting systems at the following website (if available)].</i> <u>http://www.azsos.gov/election/equipment/default.htm</u>

- 17.
18. **Pro V& V and SLI Gaming** both lack evidence of EAC Accreditation as per the Voting System Testing and Certification Manual.

19. **Pro V& V** is owned and Operated by Jack Cobb. Real name is Ryan Jackson Cobb. The company ProV&V was founded and run by Jack Cobb who formerly worked under the entity of Wyle Laboratories which is an AEROSPACE DEFENSE CONTRACTING ENTITY. The address information on the EAC, NIST and other entities for Pro V& V are different than that of what is on ProV&V website. The EAC and NIST (ISO CERT) issuers all have another address.

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL https://eac-legacy.ac-admin.com/voting/equipment/voting_system_test_laboratories_vtd/. The page has a dark header with a search bar containing 'SEARCH' and 'CLEAR' buttons. Below the header, the title 'Accredited Labs' is displayed. The main content area shows '2 results found. Page 1 of 1'. Two lab entries are listed:

- Pro V&V**
700 Boulevard South
Suite 102
Huntsville, AL 35802
Status: Accredited
Program Manager: Jack Cobb, President
Phone: 256-713-1111
[Learn More >](#)
- SLI Compliance, a Division of Gaming Laboratories International, LLC**
4720 Independence Street
Wheat Ridge, CO 80033
Status: Accredited
Program Manager: Traci Mapps, Director of Operations
Phone: 303-422-1566
[Learn More >](#)

On the right side of the page, there is a sidebar with a dark background. It contains links for 'Frequently Asked Questions', 'Manuals and Forms', and 'Test and Certification Blogs'. Below these links is a section titled 'DO YOU HAVE QUESTIONS?' with a text prompt 'Send your questions to us at clearhighscore@eac.gov or click the button below to contact us.' and a 'Contact Us' button. Further down is a 'REGISTER TO VOTE!' section with a text prompt 'Use the National Mail Voter Registration Form to register or to update your registration information with a new name or address, or register with a political party.' and a 'Register Today' button.

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL www.provande.com/contact/. The page has a dark header with the text 'Not secure: www.provande.com/contact/'. The main content area is a contact form with the following fields:

- Your Name (required):
- Your Email (required):
- Subject:
- Your Message:

Below the form is a 'Send' button. To the right of the form, the contact information for Pro V&V is displayed:

Pro V&V
5705 Odyssey Drive NW
Suite C
Huntsville, AL 35899
Office: 256-713-1111
Fax: 256-713-1112

At the bottom of the page, there is a copyright notice: '© 2023 ProV&V, Inc. All rights reserved.' and a footer: 'Theme by Tesseract'.

20. VSTLs are the most important component of the election machines as they examine the use of COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf)
21. "Wyle became involved with the testing of electronic voting systems in the early 1990's and has tested over 150 separate voting systems. Wyle was the first company to obtain accreditation by the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED). Wyle is accredited by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) as a Voting System Testing Laboratory (VSTL). Our scope of accreditation as a VSTL encompasses all aspects of the hardware and software of a voting machine. Wyle also received NVLAP accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025:2005 from NIST." Testimony of Jack Cobb 2009
22. COTS are preferred by many because they have been tried and tested in the open market and are most economic and readily available. COTS are also the SOURCE of vulnerability therefore VSTLs are VERY important. COTS components by voting system machine manufacturers can be used as a "Black Box" and changes to their specs and hardware make up change continuously. Some changes can be simple upgrades to make them more efficient in operation, cost efficient for production, end of life (EOL) and even complete reworks to meet new standards. The key issue in this is that MOST of the COTS used by Election Machine Vendors like Dominion, ES&S, Hart Intercivic, Smartmatic and others is that such manufacturing for COTS have been outsourced to China which if implemented in our Election Machines make us vulnerable to BLACK BOX antics and backdoors due to hardware changes that can go undetected. This is why VSTL's are VERY important.
23. The proprietary voting system software is done so and created with cost efficiency in mind and therefore relies on 3rd party software that is AVAILABLE and HOUSED on the HARDWARE. This is a vulnerability. Exporting system reporting using software like Crystal Reports, or PDF software allows for vulnerabilities with their constant updates.
24. As per the COTS hardware components that are fixed, and origin may be cloaked under proprietary information a major vulnerability exists since once again third-party support software is dynamic and requires FREQUENT updates. The hardware components of the computer components, and election machines that are COTS may have slight updates that can be overlooked as they may be like those designed that support the other third -party software. COTS origin is important and the US Intelligence Community report in 2018 verifies that.
25. The Trump Administration made it clear that there is an absence of a major U.S. alternative to foreign suppliers of networking equipment. This highlights the growing dominance of

Chinese manufacturers like Huawei that are the world's LARGEST supplier of telecom and other equipment that endangers national security.

26. China, is not the only nation involved in COTS provided to election machines or the networking but so is Germany via a LAOS founded Chinese linked cloud service company that works with SCYTL named Akamai Technologies that have offices in China and are linked to the server that Dominion Software.

28 046 Madrid

Asian offices

Akamai Technologies - India

111, Brigade Court
Koramangala Industrial Area
Bangalore 560 095, India

Telephone: 91-80-575-99222
Fax: 91-80-575-99209
Regional Manager: Stuart Spiteri

Akamai Technologies - China

Suite 1560, 15th Floor
NCF Tower
12A Jianguomenwai Avenue
Chaoyang District,
Beijing 100022
China

Telephone: 86-10-8523-3097
Fax: 86-10-8523-3001
Regional Manager: Stuart Spiteri

Akamai Japan K.K.

The Executive Centre Japan K.K.
15F Tokyo Ginko Kyokai building
1-2-1 Marunouchi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-
0005

Telephone: 81-3-3216-7200 (Centre)
81-3-3216-7300 (Akamai
direct)
Fax: 81-3-3216-7390 (Centre)
Regional Manager: Stuart Spiteri

Akamai Technologies - Singapore

Akamai, Regus Centre, 36-01 UOB Plaza 1
80 Raffles Place
Singapore 048624
 Driving directions

Telephone: +65 6248 4614
Fax: +65 6248-4501
Regional Manager: Stuart Spiteri

Akamai Technologies - Australia and New Zealand


201 Sussex St
Tower 2, Level 20
Sydney, NSW 2000, Australia
info@au.akamai.com

Telephone: 61 2 9006 1325
Fax: 61 2 9475 0343
Regional Manager: Stuart Spiteri

ptt.gov resolves to 4.30.228.74. According to our data this IP address belongs to *Level 3 Communications* and is located in *Alexandria, Virginia, United States*. Please have a look at the information provided below for further details.


4.30.228.74

ISP/Organization	Level 3 Communications
Location	Alexandria 22304, Virginia (VA), United States (US)
Latitude	38.8115 / 38°48'41" N
Longitude	-77.1285 / 77°7'42" W
Timezone	America/New_York
Local Time	Thu, 12 Jul 2018 19:27:40 -0400



- 27.
28. L3 Level Communications is federal contractor that is partially owned by foreign lobbyist George Soros. An article that AP ran in 2010 – spoke out about the controversy of this that has been removed. ([LINK](#)) “As for the company’s other political connections, it also appears that none other than George Soros, the billionaire funder of the country’s liberal political infrastructure, owns 11,300 shares of OSI Systems Inc., the company that owns Rapiscan. Not surprisingly, OSI’s stock has appreciated considerably over the course of the year. Soros certainly is a savvy investor.” Washington Examiner re-write.





30.

31. **L-3 Communication Systems-East** designs, develops, produces and integrates communication systems and support equipment for space, air, ground, and naval applications, including C4I systems and products; integrated Navy communication systems; integrated space communications and RF payloads; recording systems; secure communications, and information security systems. In addition, their site claims that MARCOM is an integrated communications system and The Marcom® is the foundation of the Navy's newest digital integrated voice / data switching system for affordable command and control equipment supporting communications and radio room automation. The MarCom® uses the latest COTS digital technology and open systems standards to offer the command and control user a low cost, user friendly, solution to the complex voice, video and data communications needs of present and future joint / allied missions. Built in reliability, rugged construction, and fail-safe circuits ensure your call and messages will go through. Evidently a HUGE vulnerability.

32. Michigan's government site is thumped off Akamai Technologies servers which are housed on **TELIA AB** a foreign server located in Germany.
33. Scytl, who is contracted with AP that receives the results tallied BY Scytl on behalf of Dominion – During the elections the AP reporting site had a disclaimer.
AP – powered by SCYTL.

Advertisements	Basic Tracking Info
	Domain: Michigan.gov [Whois Lookup] Domain Country Domain To IP
	IP Address: 23.78.81.34 IP Blacklist Check
	Reverse DNS: 34.81.78.23.in-addr.arpa
	Hostname: a23-78-81-34.deploy.static.akamaitechnologies.com
	a12-67.akam.net >> 184.26.160.67
	a11-66.akam.net >> 84.53.139.66
	a1-35.akam.net >> 193.108.91.35
	Nameservers: a5-66.akam.net >> 95.100.168.66
	a18-64.akam.net >> 95.101.36.64
	a24-65.akam.net >> 2.16.130.65
	Location For an IP: Michigan.gov
	Continent: North America (NA)
	Country: United States  (US)
	Capital: Washington
	State: Unknown
	City: Unknown
	Location: Unknown
	ISP: Akamai Technologies
	Organization: Akamai Technologies
	AS Number: AS1299 Telia Company AB
	something went wrong! something went wrong!
	Geolocation on IP Map
	Time Zone: America/North_Dakota/Center
	Local Time: 13:48:46
	Timezone: -21600
	GMT offset: -21600
	Sunrise / Sunset: 07:27 / 17:12
	Extra Information for an IP: Michigan.gov
	Continent Lat/Lon: 46.07305 / -100.546
	Country Lat/Lon: 38 / -98
	City Lat/Lon: (37.751) / (-97.822)
	IP Language: English

34. "Scytl was selected by the Federal Voting Assistance Program of the U.S. Department of Defense to provide a secure online ballot delivery and onscreen marking systems under a program to support overseas military and civilian voters for the 2010 election cycle and beyond. Scytl was awarded 9 of the 20 States that agreed to participate in the program (New York, Washington, Missouri, Nebraska, Kansas, New Mexico, South Carolina, Mississippi and Indiana), making it the provider with the highest number of participating States." PDF
35. According to DOMINION : 1.4.1 Software and Firmware The software and firmware employed by Dominion D-Suite 5.5-A consists of 2 types, custom and commercial off the shelf (COTS). COTS applications were verified to be pristine or were subjected to source code review for analysis of any modifications and verification of meeting the pertinent standards.
36. The concern is the HARDWARE and the NON – ACCREDITED VSTLs as by their own admittance use COTS.
37. The purpose of VSTL's being accredited and their importance in ensuring that there is no foreign interference/ bad actors accessing the tally data via backdoors in equipment software. The core software used by ALL SCYTL related Election Machine/Software manufacturers ensures "anonymity" .
38. Algorithms within the area of this "shuffling" to maintain anonymity allows for setting values to achieve a desired goal under the guise of "encryption" in the trap-door.
39. The actual use of trapdoor commitments in Bayer-Groth proofs demonstrate the implications for the verifiability factor. This means that no one can SEE what is going on during the process of the "shuffling" therefore even if you deploy an algorithms or manual scripts to fractionalize or distribute pooled votes to achieve the outcome you wish – you cannot prove they are doing it! See STUDY : "The use of trapdoor commitments in Bayer-Groth proofs and the implications for the verifiability of the Scytl-SwissPost Internet voting system"

40. Key Terms

41. **UNIVERSAL VERIFIABILITY:** Votes cast are the votes counted and integrity of the vote is verifiable (the vote was tallied for the candidate selected) . **SCYTL FAILS UNIVERSAL VERIFIABILITY** because no mathematical proofs can determine if any votes have been manipulated.
42. **INDIVIDUAL VERIFIABILITY:** Voter cannot verify if their ballot got correctly counted. Like, if they cast a vote for ABC they want to verify it was ABC. That notion clearly discounts the need for anonymity in the first place.

43. To understand what I observed during the 2020 I will walk you through the process of one ballot cast by a voter.
44. STEP 1 |Config Data | All non e-voting data is sent to Scytl (offshore) for configuration of data. All e-voting is sent to CONFIGURATION OF DATA then back to the e-voting machine and then to the next phase called CLEANSING. **CONCERNS:** Here we see an “OR PROOF” as coined by mathematicians – an “or proof” is that votes that have been pre-tallied parked in the system and the algorithm then goes back to set the outcome it is set for and seeks to make adjustments if there is a partial pivot present causing it to fail demanding manual changes such as block allocation and narrowing of parameters or self-adjusts to ensure the predetermined outcome is achieved.
45. STEP 2|CLEANSING | The Process is when all the votes come in from the software run by Dominion and get “cleansed” and put into 2 categories: invalid votes and valid votes.
46. STEP 3|Shuffling /Mixing | This step is the most nefarious and exactly where the issues arise and carry over into the decryption phase. Simply put, the software takes all the votes, literally mixes them a and then re-encrypts them. This is where if ONE had the commitment key- TRAPDOOR KEY – one would be able to see the parameters of the algorithm deployed as the votes go into this mixing phase, and how algorithm redistributes the votes.
47. This published PAPER FROM University College London depicts how this shuffle works. In essence, when this mixing/shuffling occurs, then one doesn’t have the ability to know that vote coming out on the other end is actually their vote; therefore, ZERO integrity of the votes when mixed.

48.

Background - ElGamal encryption

- Setup: Group $\mathcal{G}$ of prime order q with generator g
- Public key: $pk = y = g^x$
- Encryption: $\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m; r) = (g^r, y^r m)$
- Decryption: $\mathcal{D}_x(u, v) = vu^{-x}$
- Homomorphic:

$$\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m; r) \times \mathcal{E}_{pk}(M; R) = \mathcal{E}_{pk}(mM; r + R)$$

- Re-encryption:

$$\mathcal{E}_{pk}(m; r) \times \mathcal{E}_{pk}(1; R) = \mathcal{E}_{pk}(m; r + R)$$



49. When this mixing/shuffling occurs, then one doesn't have the ability to know that vote coming out on the other end is actually their vote; therefore, ZERO integrity of the votes.
50. When the votes are sent to Scytal via Dominion Software EMS (Election Management System) the Trap Door is accessed by Scytal or TRAP DOOR keys (Commitment Parameters).



52. The encrypted data is shifted into Scytal's platform in the form of ciphertexts – this means it is encrypted and a key based on commitments is needed to read the data. The ballot data can only be read if the person has a key that is set on commitments.
53. A false sense of security is provided to both parties that votes are not being “REPLACED” during the mixing phase. Basically, Scytal re-encrypts the ballot data that comes in from Dominion (or any other voting software company) as ciphertexts. Scytal is supposed to prove that votes A, B, C are indeed X, Y, Z under their new re-encryption when sending back the votes that are tallied coding them respectively. This is done by Scytal and the Election Software company that agrees to certain

“Generators” and therefore together build “commitments.”

```
public CommitmentParams(final ZpSubgroup group, final int n) {
    group = group;
    h = GroupTools.getRandomElement(group);
    commitmentlength = n;
    g = GroupTools.getVectorRandomElement(group,
    this.commitmentlength);
}

// from getRandomElement(group)
Exponent randomExponent = ExponentTools.getRandomExponent(group.getQ());
return group.getGenerator().exponentiate(randomExponent);
```

54. Scytl and Dominion have an agreement – only the two would know the parameters. This means that access is able to occur through backdoors in hardware if the parameters of the commitments are known in order to alter the range of the algorithm deployed to satisfy the outcome sought in the case of algorithm failure.
55. Trapdoor is a cryptotech term that describes a state of a program that knows the commitment parameters and therefore is able change the value of the commitments however it likes. In other words, Scytl or anyone that knows the commitment parameters can take all the votes and give them to any one they want. If they have a total of 1000 votes an algorithm can distribute them among all races as it deems necessary to achieve the goals it wants. (Case Study: Estonia)

$$\text{Commitment}_{\text{CRYPT}} = \text{CM}_c$$

Scytl sets commitment-simple math

$$\text{CM}_c(\vec{a}; r) = H \prod_{i=1}^n G_i^{a_i} = 1 \cdot G_i^{a_i}$$

$$\text{CM}_c(\vec{a}; r) = H^r + \sum_{i=1}^n (a_i - z_i) e_i \prod_{j=1}^n H^{z_j e_j}$$


$$\text{CM}_c(\vec{a}; r) = \text{CM}_c(\vec{z}; r')$$

$$r' = r + \sum_{i=1}^n e_i (a_i - z_i)$$

56.

57. Within the trapdoor this is how the algorithm behaves to move the goal posts in elections without being detected by this proof. During the mixing phase this is the algorithm you would use to


“reallocate” votes via an algorithm to achieve the goal set.



58. STEP 4|Decryption would be the decryption phase and temporary parking of vote tallies before reporting. In this final phase before public release the tallies are released from encrypted format into plain text. As previously explained, those that know the trapdoor can easily change any votes that the randomness is applied and used to generate the tally vote ciphertext. Thus in this case, Scyt1 who is the mixer can collude with their vote company clients or an agency (-----) to change votes and get away with it. This is because the receiver doesn't have the decryption key so they rely solely on Scyt1 to be **honest** or free from any foreign actors within their backdoor or the Election Company (like Dominion) that can have access to the key.
59. In fact, a study from the University of Bristol made claim that interference can be seen when there is a GREAT DELAY in reporting and finalizing numbers University of Bristol : How not to Prove Yourself: Pitfalls of the Fiat-Shamir Heuristic and Applications to Helios
60. “Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge allow a prover to convince a verifier that she holds information satisfying some desirable properties without revealing anything else.” David Bernhard, Olivier Pereira, and Bogdan Warinschi.

61. Hence, you can't prove anyone manipulated anything. The TRAP DOOR KEY HOLDERS can offer you enough to verify to you what you need to see without revealing anything and once again indicating the inability to detect manipulation. **ZERO PROOF of INTEGRITY OF THE VOTE.**
62. Therefore, if decryption is challenged, the administrator or software company that knows the trap door key can provide you proof that would be able to pass verification (blind). This was proven to be factually true in the case study by The University of Melbourne in March. White Hat Hackers purposely altered votes by knowing the parameters set in the commitments and there was no way to prove they did it – or any way to prove they didn't.
63. IT'S THE PERFECT THREE CARD MONTY. That's just how perfect it is. They fake a proof of ciphertexts with KNOWN "RANDOMNESS". This rolls back to the integrity of the VOTE. The vote is not safe using these machines not only because of the method used for ballot "cleansing" to maintain anonymity but the EXPOSURE to foreign interference and possible domestic bad actors.
64. In many circumstances, manipulation of the algorithm is NOT possible in an undetectable fashion. This is because it is one point heavy. Observing the elections in 2020 confirm the deployment of an algorithm due to the BEHAVIOR which is indicative of an algorithm in play that had no pivoting parameters applied.
65. The behavior of the algorithm is that one point (B) is the greatest point within the allocated set. It is the greatest number within the A B points given. Point A would be the smallest. Any points outside the A B points are not necessarily factored in yet can still be applied.
66. The points outside the parameters can be utilized to a certain degree such as in block allocation.
67. The algorithm geographically changed the parameters of the algorithm to force blue votes and ostracize red.
68. Post block allocation of votes the two points of the algorithm were narrowed ensuring a BIDEN win hence the observation of NO Trump Votes and some BIDEN votes for a period of time.

ARIZONA "FIXING" THE VOTE




*DATA SOURCED FROM NEW YORK TIMES

SUMMARY

- Mathematical evidence of the seeding "injection" of votes at the beginning
- A spike means that a large number of votes were injected into the totals
- A normal vote pattern would look like a natural progression – smooth without extreme jumps

70. Gaussian Elimination without pivoting explains how the algorithm would behave and the election results and data from Michigan confirm FAILURE of algorithm.



71. The "Digital Fix" observed with an increased spike in VOTES for Joe Biden can be determined as evidence of a pivot. Normally it would be assumed that the algorithm had a Complete Pivot. Wilkinson's demonstrated the guarantee as :

$$\frac{\|U\|_{\infty}}{\|A\|_{\infty}} \leq n^{\frac{1}{2} \log(n)}$$


72.

73. Such a conjecture allows the growth factor the ability to be upper bound by values closer to n . Therefore, complete pivoting can't be observed because there would be too many floating points. Nor can partial as the partial pivoting would overwhelm after the "injection" of votes. Therefore, external factors were used which is evident from the "DIGITAL FIX"
74. Observing the elections, after a review of Michigan's data a spike of 54,199 votes to Biden. Because it is pushing and pulling and keeping a short distance between the 2 candidates; but then a spike, which is how an algorithm presents; - and this spike means there was a pause and an insert was made, where they insert an algorithm. Block spikes in votes for JOE BIDEN were NOT paper

ballots being fed or THUMB DRIVES. The algorithm block adjusted itself and the PEOPLE were creating the evidence to BACK UP the block allocation.

75. I have witnessed the same behavior of the election software in countries outside of the United States and within the United States. In -----, the elections conducted behaved in the same manner by allocating BLOCK votes to the candidate “chosen” to win.
76. Observing the data of the contested states (and others) the algorithm deployed is identical to that which was deployed in 2012 providing Barack Hussein Obama a block allocation to win the 2012 Presidential Elections.
77. The algorithm looks to have been set to give Joe Biden a 52% win even with an initial 50K+ vote block allocation was provided initially as tallying began (as in case of Arizona too). In the am of November 4, 2020 the algorithm stopped working, therefore another “block allocation” to remedy the failure of the algorithm. This was done manually as ALL the SYSTEMS shut down NATIONWIDE to avoid detection.

GEORGIA “FIXING” THE VOTE



*DATA SOURCED FROM NEW YORK TIMES

SUMMARY


- The spike on the morning of Nov. 4 resulted in a net increase of 107,040 to Biden's total
- A spike means that a large number of votes were injected into the totals
- A normal vote pattern would look like a natural progression – smooth without

- 78.
79. In Georgia during the 2016 Presidential Elections a failed attempt to deploy the scripts to block allocate votes from a centralized location where the “trap-door” key lay an attempt by someone using

the DHS servers was detected by the state of GA. The GA leadership assumed that it was "Russians" but later they found out that the IP address was that of DHS.

80. In the state of Wisconsin, we observed a considerable BLOCK vote allocation by the algorithm at the SAME TIME it happened across the nation. All systems shut down at around the same time.

Total presidential votes for each party so far, with 89 percent of Wisconsin's expected vote counted as of 6:23 a.m on Nov. 4



81.

82. In Wisconsin there are also irregularities in respect to BALLOT requests. (names AND address Hidden for privacy)

F	G	H	V	W	X	Y	AB	AC	AD	AG	AH	AI	AJ	AK	AL	AN
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/01/2020	Online	Military		Official	Active	Not Returned	Online	11/01/2020				
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	10/23/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Voted in Person	10/23/2020	10/23/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/01/2020	Online	Military		Official	Active	Not Returned	Online	11/01/2020				
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/01/2020	Online											
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/01/2020	Email	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Mail	10/31/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Mail	10/31/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Voted in Person	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Voted in Person	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Voted in Person	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Voted in Person	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Voted in Person	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Online											
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Received in Person Hospitaliz			Official	Active	Returned	Appointed Agent	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Email	Hospitaliz		Official	Active	Returned	Appointed Agent	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/02/2020	Mail											
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Mail	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Appointed Agent	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Mail	Regular		Official	Active	Returned	Appointed Agent	11/02/2020	11/02/2020			
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/02/2020	Online	Military		Official	Active	Not Returned	Online	11/02/2020				
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/02/2020	Online	Military		Official	Active	Not Returned	Online	11/02/2020				
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/02/2020	Online											
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/02/2020	FPCA	Military		Official	Active	Not Returned	Mail	11/02/2020				
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/02/2020	FPCA	Military		Official	Active	Returned	Email	11/02/2020	11/01/2020			
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/03/2020	Voted in Person	Regular		Official	Inactive	Voter Spoiled	Voted in Person	11/03/2020	11/03/2020			
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/03/2020	Mail		Certification insufficient	Federal Absents	Active	Returned, to be Rejected	Mail	11/03/2020	11/03/2020			
Active	Registered	Military	Brown County	11/03/2020	Mail	Military		Official	Active	Not Returned	Mail	11/03/2020				
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/03/2020	Online											
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online											
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online											
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online											
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online											
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online											
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Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online											
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online											
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online											

83.

Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/03/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/04/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/05/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/05/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/05/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/05/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/05/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/05/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/05/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/05/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/05/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/05/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/06/2020	Online
Active	Registered	Regular	Brown County	11/06/2020	Online

84.

- 85. I can personally attest that in 2013 discussions by the Obama / Biden administration were being had with various agencies in the deployment of such election software to be deployed in ----- in 2013.
- 86. On or about April 2013 a one year plan was set to fund and usher elections in -----.
- 87. Joe Biden was designated by Barack Hussein Obama to ensure the ----- accepted assistance.
- 88. John Owen Brennan and James (Jim) Clapper were responsible for the ushering of the intelligence surrounding the elections in -----.
- 89. Under the guise of Crisis support the US Federal Tax Payers funded the deployment of the election software and machines in ----- signing on with ScytI.

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release

April 21, 2014

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FACT SHEET: U.S. Crisis Support Package for Ukraine

President Obama and Vice President Biden have made U.S. support for Ukraine an urgent priority as the Ukrainian government works to establish security and stability, pursue democratic elections and constitutional reform, revive its economy, and ensure government institutions are transparent and accountable to the Ukrainian people. Ukraine embarks on this reform path in the face of severe challenges to its sovereignty and territorial integrity, which we are working to address together with Ukraine and our partners in the international community. The United States is committed to ensuring that Ukrainians alone are able to determine their country's future without intimidation or coercion from outside forces. To support Ukraine, we are today announcing a new package of assistance totaling **\$50 million** to help Ukraine pursue political and economic reform and strengthen the partnership between the United States and Ukraine.

91. Right before the ----- elections it was alleged that CyberBerkut a pro-Russia group infiltrated --- central election computers and deleted key files. These actions supposedly rendered the vote-tallying system inoperable.
92. In fact, the KEY FILES were the Commitment keys to allow Scytl to tally the votes rather than the election machines. The group had disclosed emails and other documents proving that their election was rigged and that they tried to avoid a fixed election.
93. The elections were held on May 25, 2014 but in the early AM hours the election results were BLOCKED and the final tally was DELAYED flipping the election in favor of -----.
94. The claim was that there was a DDoS attack by Russians when in actual fact it was a mitigation of the algorithm to inject block votes as we observed was done for Joe Biden because the KEYS were unable to be deployed. In the case of -----, the trap-door key was “altered”/deleted/ rendered ineffective. In the case of the US elections, representatives of Dominion/ ES&S/ Smartmatic/ Hart Intercivic would have to manually deploy them since if the entry points into the systems seemed to have failed.
95. The vote tallying of all states NATIONWIDE stalled and hung for days – as in the case of Alaska that has about 300K registered voters but was stuck at 56% reporting for almost a week.
96. This “hanging” indicates a failed deployment of the scripts to block allocate remotely from one location as observed in ----- on May 26, 2014.
97. This would justify the presence of the election machine software representatives making physical appearances in the states where the election results are currently being contested.
98. A Dominion Executive appeared at the polling center in Detroit after midnight.
99. Considering that the hardware of the machines has NOT been examined in Michigan since 2017 by Pro V& V according to Michigan’s own reporting. COTS are an avenue that hackers and bad actors seek to penetrate in order to control operations. Their software updates are the reason vulnerabilities to foreign interference in all operations exist.
100. The importance of VSTLs is underrated to protect up from foreign interference by way of open access via COTS software. Pro V& V who’s EAC certification EXPIRED on 24 FEB 2017 was contracted with the state of WISCONSIN.
101. In the United States each state is tasked to conduct and IV& V (Independent Verification and Validation) to provide assurance of the integrity of the votes.
102. If the “accredited” non-federal entities have NOT received EAC accreditation this is a failure of the states to uphold their own states standards that are federally regulated.
103. In addition, if the entities had NIST certificates they are NOT sufficing according the HAVA ACT 2002 as the role of NIST is clear.
104. Curiously, both companies PRO V&V and SLI GAMING received NIST certifications OUTSIDE the 24 month scope.

105. PRO V& V received a NIST certification on 26MAR2020 for ONE YEAR. Normally the NIST certification is good for two years to align with that of EAC certification that is good for two years.



107. The last PRO V& V EAC accreditation certificate (Item 8) of this declaration expired in February 2017 which means that the IV & V conducted by Michigan claiming that they were accredited is false.
108. The significance of VSTLs being accredited and examining the HARDWARE is key. COTS software updates are the avenues of entry.
109. As per DOMINION'S own petition, the modems they use are COTS therefore failure to have an accredited VSTL examine the hardware for points of entry by their software is key.

*Compact Flash Cards	<u>***SanDisk Ultra:</u> SDCFHS-004G SDCFHS-008G <u>RiData:</u> CFC-14A RDF8G-233XMCB2-1 RDF16G-233XMCB2-1 RDF32G-233XMCB2-1 <u>SanDisk Extreme:</u> SDCFX-016G SDCFX-032G <u>SanDisk:</u> SDFAA-008G		Memory device for ICP and ICE tabulators.
*Modems	Verizon USB Modem Pantech UMW190NCD USB Modem MultiTech MT9234MU CellGo Cellular Modem E-Device 3GPUSUS AT&T USB Modem MultiTech GSM MTD-H5 Fax Modem US Robotics 56K V.92.		Analog and wireless modems for transmitting unofficial election night results.

110.

111. For example and update of Verizon USB Modem Pantech undergoes multiple software updates a year for it's hardware. That is most likely the point of entry into the systems.

112. During the 2014 elections in ---- it was the modems that gave access to the systems where the commitment keys were deleted.

113. SLI Gaming is the other VSTL "accredited" by the EAC BUT there is no record of their accreditation. In fact, SLI was NIST ISO Certified 27 days before the election which means that PA IV&V was conducted without NIST cert for SLI being valid.

United States Department of Commerce
National Institute of Standards and Technology



Certificate of Accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025:2017

NVLAP LAB CODE: 200733-0

SLI Compliance
Wheat Ridge, CO

*is accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program for specific services,
listed on the Scope of Accreditation, for:*

Voting System Testing

*This laboratory is accredited in accordance with the recognized International Standard ISO/IEC 17025:2017.
This accreditation demonstrates technical competence for a defined scope and the operation of a laboratory quality
management system (refer to joint ISO-ILAC-IAF Communiqué dated January 2009).*

2020-10-07 through 2020-12-31
Effective Dates



[Signature]
For the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program

- 114.
115. In fact SLI was NIST ISO Certified for less than 90 days.
116. I can personally attest that high-level officials of the Obama/Biden administration and large private contracting firms met with a software company called GEMS which is ultimately the software ALL election machines run now running under the flag of DOMINION.
117. GEMS was manifested from SOE software purchased by SCYTL developers and US Federally Funded persons to develop it.
118. The only way GEMS can be deployed across ALL machines is IF all counties across the nation are housed under the same server networks.
119. GEMS was tasked in 2009 to a contractor in Tampa, Fl.
120. GEMS was also fine-tuned in Latvia, Belarus, Serbia and Spain to be localized for EU deployment as observed during the Swissport election debacle.
121. John McCain's campaign assisted in FUNDING the development of GEMS web monitoring via WEB Services with 3EDC and Dynology.

SCHEDULE B-P **ITEMIZED DISBURSEMENTS**

Use separate schedule(s)
for each category of the
Detailed Summary Page

FOR LINE NUMBER:
(check only one)

PAGE 7359 / 8595

☒ 23 ☐ 24 ☐ 25 ☐ 26 ☐ 27a
☐ 27b ☐ 28a ☐ 28b ☐ 28c ☐ 29

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NAME OF COMMITTEE (In Full)

JOHN MCCAIN 2008, INC.

Full Name (Last, First, Middle Initial)

A. 3EDC LLC

Mailing Address 211 NORTH UNION ST STE 200

City
ALEXANDRIA

State Zip Code
VA 22314

Purpose of Disbursement
WEB SERVICE

Candidate Name

Category/
Type

Office Sought:

☐ House
☐ Senate
☐ President

Disbursement For: 2008

☒ Primary ☐ General
☐ Other (specify) ▼

State: District:

Date of Disbursement

MM / DD / YYYY
03 / 17 / 2008

Transaction ID : SB23.10515

Amount of Each Disbursement this Period

399916.09

Full Name (Last, First, Middle Initial)

B. A FARE EXTRAORDINAIRE

Mailing Address 2035 MARSHALL

City
HOUSTON

State Zip Code
TX 77098

Purpose of Disbursement
FACILITY RENTAL/CATERING

Candidate Name

Category/
Type

Office Sought:

☐ House
☐ Senate
☐ President

Disbursement For: 2008

☒ Primary ☐ General
☐ Other (specify) ▼

State: District:

Date of Disbursement

MM / DD / YYYY
03 / 17 / 2008

Transaction ID : SB23.10049

Amount of Each Disbursement this Period

23697.69

Full Name (Last, First, Middle Initial)

C. ADMINISTAFF

Mailing Address PO BOX 203332

City
HOUSTON

State Zip Code
TX 77216

Purpose of Disbursement
INSURANCE

Candidate Name

Category/
Type

Office Sought:

☐ House
☐ Senate
☐ President

Disbursement For: 2008

☒ Primary ☐ General
☐ Other (specify) ▼

State: District:

Date of Disbursement

MM / DD / YYYY
03 / 05 / 2008

Transaction ID : SB23.10117

Amount of Each Disbursement this Period

463.68

Subtotal Of Receipts This Page (optional).....

424097.46

Total This Period (last page this line number only).....


122.

123.

124. AKAMAI Technologies services SCYTL.

125. AKAMAI Technologies Houses ALL foreign government sites. (Please see White Paper by Akamai.)

126. AKAMAI Technologies houses ALL .gov state sites. (ref Item 123 Wisconsin.gov Example)



127.

128. Wisconsin has EDGE GATEWAY port which is AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES based out of GERMANY.

129. Using AKAMAI Technologies is allowing .gov sites to obfuscate and mask their systems by way of HURRICANE ELECTRIC (he.net) Kicking it to anonymous (AKAMAI Technologies) offshore servers.

Hosts	General	Services	Traceroute
wisconsin.gov (165.189.150.147)			
	3	3.00	207.89.33.137
	4	4.00	10.40.50.7
	5	13.00	172.22.7.24
	6	15.00	206.126.236.37 10gigabitethernet2-2.core1.ash1.he.net
	7	41.00	184.105.64.133 100ge1-1.core2.chi1.he.net
	8	27.00	184.104.192.117 100ge15-2.core1.chi1.he.net
	9	32.00	184.105.65.226 100ge8-1.core1.msn1.he.net
	10	35.00	216.66.73.242 airstream-communications-llc.10gigabitethernet2-20.core1.msn1.he.net
	11	37.00	64.33.130.57 air-cpdg-asr-to-mdsn.airstreamcomm.net.130.33.64.in-addr.arpa
	12	37.00	64.33.143.186 win-retail-wi-doa-001-2.direct.airstreamcomm.net
	13		<unknown>
	14		<unknown>
	15	38.00	165.189.150.147

130.

131. AKAMAI Technologies has locations around the world.

132. AKAMAI Technologies has locations in China (ref item 22)

133. AKAMAI Technologies has locations in Iran as of 2019.

134. AKAMAI Technologies merged with UNICOM (CHINESE TELECOMM) in 2018.

135. AKAMAI Technologies house all state .gov information in GERMANY via TELIA AB.

136. In my professional opinion, this affidavit presents unambiguous evidence:
137. That there was Foreign interference, complicit behavior by the previous administrations from 1999 up until today to hinder the voice of the people and US persons knowingly and willingly colluding with foreign powers to steer our 2020 elections that can be named in a classified setting.
138. Foreign interference is present in the 2020 election in various means namely,
139. Foreign nationals assisted in the creation of GEMS (Dominion Software Foundation)
140. Akamai Technologies merged with a Chinese company that makes the COTS components of the election machines providing access to our electronic voting machines.
141. Foreign investments and interests in the creation of the GEMS software.
142. US persons holding an office and private individuals knowingly and willingly oversaw fail safes to secure our elections.
143. The EAC failed to abide by standards set in HAVA ACT 2002.
144. The IG of the EAC failed to address complaints since their appointment regarding vote integrity
145. Christy McCormick of the EAC failed to ensure that EAC conducted their duties as set forth by HAVA ACT 2002
146. Both Patricia Layfield (IG of EAC) and Christy McCormick (Chairwoman of EAC) were appointed by Barack Hussein Obama and have maintained their positions since then.
147. The EAC failed to have a quorum for over a calendar year leading to the inability to meet the standards of the EAC.
148. AKAMAI Technologies and Hurricane Electric raise serious concerns for NATSEC due to their ties with foreign hostile nations.
149. For all the reasons above a complete failure of duty to provide safe and just elections are observed.
150. For the people of the United States to have confidence in their elections our cybersecurity standards should not be in the hands of foreign nations.
151. Those responsible within the Intelligence Community directly and indirectly by way of procurement of services should be held accountable for assisting in the development, implementation and promotion of GEMS.
152. GEMS ----- General Hayden.
153. In my opinion and from the data and events I have observed ----- with the assistance of SHADOWNET under the guise of L3-Communications which is MPRI. This is also confirmed by us.army.mil making the statement that shadownet has been deployed to 30 states which all

happen to be using Dominion Machines.

FAIRFAX, Va. -The Virginia National Guard's Bowling Green-based 91st Cyber Brigade completed the nationwide rollout of its ShadowNet enterprise solution July 19, 2019, with the integration of the 125th Cyber Protection Battalion into the solution's virtual private network. ShadowNet is a custom-built private cloud-based out of the brigade's data center in Fairfax, Virginia, that uses VPN connectivity to provide its aligned units with 24-hour, seven-days-a-week remote access to critical cyber training at both the collective and individual levels. The brigade successfully integrated its three other cyber protection battalions - the 123rd, 124th, and 126th Cyber Protection Battalions - into the ShadowNet platform last January.

"I'm extremely proud to announce that the Soldiers of the 91st Cyber Brigade have completed the construction and rollout of ShadowNet, a world-class enterprise solution designed to propel operational innovation in the field of cyber training," said Col. Adam C. Volant, commander of the 91st Cyber Brigade. "ShadowNet will allow us to leverage the expertise of cyber professionals across our four cyber protection battalions to build Soldier-centric programs and collective training environments that deliver breakthroughs in training complexity and cost efficiency. Its robust

OCTOBER 26, 2020

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SEPTEMBER 12, 2019

September 2017 Nominative Sergeant's Major Assignments

SEPTEMBER 12, 2019

DA ANNOUNCES ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS

154. Based on my research of voter data – it appears that there are approximately 23,000 residents of a Department of Corrections Prison with requests for absentee ballot in Wisconsin. We are currently reviewing and verifying the data and will supplement.

	23230	Gutierrez	ivally	Jane	(262)994-9050	
23231	23231	Hansen	Luann	M	(262)994-9050	
23232	23232	Neberman	John	C	(262)994-9050	
23233	23233	Reynolds	Devi	J	(262)994-9050	
23234	23234	Rieckhoff	Kathryn	Susan	(262)994-9050	
23235	23235	Edwards	Mark	Landon	(262)994-9050	
23236	23236	Pfeiffer	Joseph	Patrick	(262)994-9050	
23237	23237	Hines	Dianna	K	(262)994-9050	
23238	23238	Beachem	Janice	F	(262)994-9050	
23239	23239	Blackstone	Thomas	Wayne	(262)994-9050	
23240	23240	Braun	Patricia	Ann	(262)994-9050	
23241	23241	Smith	Raymond	L	(262)994-9050	
23242	23242	Meyer	Steven	R	(262)994-9050	
23243	23243	Vincent	Herbert		(262)994-9050	
23244	23244	Guajardo	Juan	P	(262)994-9050	
23245	23245	Wallace	Kirk	R	(262)994-9050	
23246	23246	Kaplan	Bernard	L	(262)994-9050	
23247	23247	Bahrs	Michelle	M	(262)994-9050	
23248	23248	Shattuck	Elizabeth	L	(262)994-9050	
23249	23249	Munoz	Rosalio	S	JR (262)994-9050	
23250	23250	Strunk	Amy	C	(262)994-9050	
23251	23251	Schendel	Michael	P	JR (262)994-9050	
23252	23252	Mack	Kimberly	N	(262)994-9050	
23253	23253	Spikes	Debra	A	(262)994-9050	
23254	23254	Busarow	Suzanne	M	(262)994-9050	
23255	23255	Oliver	Timmy		(262)994-9050	
23256	23256	Wember	Jimmy	Dean	(262)994-9050	
23257	23257	Kosterman	Michael	Richard	(262)994-9050	
23258	23258	Szaradowski	Paul	M	(262)994-9050	
23259	23259	Oliver	Dale		(262)994-9050	
23260	23260	Derango	Nancy		(262)994-9050	
23261	23261	Smith	Arthur	J	(262)994-9050	SMITH24.3059@YAHOO
23262	23262	Brown	Michael	Edward	(262)994-9050	

I declare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Executed this November 29th, 2020.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Terpsehore P Maras', written in a cursive style.

Terpsehore P Maras